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Tomo Susake



One is enough for an increasing number of Japanese families (see story, page 3).

European birth rates equalizing? The 1990s have brought downturns—some precipitous—in the birth rates of several countries of Eastern Europe. The 1990 crude birth rate (CBR) in Bulgaria began a downward path in the late 1980s and fell from 13 per 1,000 population in 1988 to below 12 per 1,000 in 1990. In Poland, the CBR of 16 per 1,000 in 1989 has fallen to 14 according to the latest figures (the twelve-month period ending March, 1991). In the extreme case of Romania, which formerly banned both abortion and contraception, births tumbled from 16 per 1,000 in 1989 to below 12 for the twelve months ending July 1991.

In two other Eastern European nations, birth rates have not changed very much, however. Czechoslovakia's CBR stood at 14 for the twelve-month period ending in July 1991, the same as its 1989 rate. In Hungary, the birth rate for the twelve months ending in


September 1991 was 12, essentially the same as in 1989.

During the 1980s, European demographers discussed why the birth rate of Eastern Europe persistently exceeded that of Western Europe—by three or four births per 1,000 population. The difference is relative, of course. The 1980s birth rates of Eastern European countries were already low in world terms—45 per 1,000 for Africa and 28 for Asia in 1989. Still, recalls PRB's Carl Haub, European demographers wondered whether "socialism artificially propped up the birth rate," citing the possible pronatalist effect of Eastern European programs such as rent control, giving priority access to housing to married couples, and subsidizing child care.

Now, with what was once called the Iron Curtain no longer artificially separating Eastern from Western Europe, they are wondering if birth rates will equalize across Europe.

—Susan Kalish

Japan's Steady Fertility Decline



Source: Japan Institute of Population Problems and UN Demographic Yearbook, 1949-50.

Fertility decline in Japan is a long-term trend (see stories, pages 3 and 12). From 1930, when women averaged almost five children in their lifetimes, the total fertility rate plunged during the World War II years, followed by a modest baby boom. The fertility dip in 1966, the Year of the Fiery Horse (which occurs every 60 years), is said to be due to the traditional belief that a girl born that year will not only be unlucky, but she will grow up to murder her husband.

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Japan's Declining Fertility: "1.53 Shock"

In 1990, Japanese newspapers, magazines, and television paid a lot of attention to a phenomenon they called "1.57 shock." The phrase "1.57 shock" (an idea something like "future shock") expressed the country's sense of disbelief that Japanese women were averaging only little more than one and a half children per lifetime.

But the shocks just kept coming. A year later, the Japanese TFR (total fertility rate, or average number of lifetime births a woman could expect to have, given current birth rates) slid further downward to 1.53.

Official estimates showed that Japan's annual population growth rate between 1989 and 1990 had dropped to its lowest postwar level, just 0.33 percent per year. Just-released population projections now show that Japan's population will begin to decline after 2010. And, Japan is already experiencing some demographic consequences of extremely low fertility: a dearth of young workers and an increasing cost of health care for the elderly. According to Tokyo Shoko Research, a shortage of labor has forced the closing of a rising proportion of successful businesses: from less than 1 percent of closings in 1988 to 6 percent in 1990.

In 1990, the Japanese government instituted the Public Opinion Survey on Population Issues, based on a national sample of 22,811 men and women ages 20-69, and plans to repeat the survey every five years. The results were released in March 1991. As the report explains: "There appears to be an increasing possibility that some sort of



Marriage remains popular, but family size is problematic.

population policy will be required in the future. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to monitor people's opinion closely on demographic issues."

Some of the major findings:

- The Japanese say they want more children than they are having. The "intended" number of children averaged 2.2 while the number considered "ideal" averaged 2.6. This ideal has not changed appreciably in the past decade, according to Japan's 1977, 1982, and 1987 National Fertility Surveys.

- About 40 percent of the respondents said the recent decline in fertility was undesirable while only 9 percent said desirable. Thirty-five percent of those who said "undesirable" cited "aging of population" as a reason. Twenty-one percent cited "a shortage of labor force," 17 percent "declining sociocultural activity," and 5 percent "declining population size."

Sixty-five percent of those who said "undesirable" thought that government should take some action to raise the birth rate. The most frequently cited policies were:

- 1) reduction

of the economic strain of raising a child (53 percent), 2) creation of a more favorable environment for a newlywed couple to have children (for example, more affordable housing, 29 percent), 3) development of child-care facilities and child-care leave (13 percent).

- The traditional norm of Japanese women marrying by age 25 continues to erode. The survey found that 38 percent of women age 25-29 were unmarried. In 1970, only 18 percent of this age group were unmarried. In 1980, it was 24 percent. Nevertheless, all but 2 percent of single women surveyed expected to marry some day.

- The survey questioned attitudes toward such issues as divorce, premarital sexual relations, extramarital relations, the custom of brides taking their husband's name, whether husbands should share the housework, and the traditional practice of a married couple sharing their home with elderly parents, generally the husband's parents. There was a significant gender gap on these issues. The responses suggested a growing critical attitude among women—especially those in their late 20s to late 30s—toward the traditional family system with its three-generation household in which men are not expected to do any housework. On the lifestyle issues of premarital and extramarital sex, women were more conservative than men.

- When asked if Japan's current liberal abortion law should be restricted, from one-quarter to one-third of married people answered "yes." This proportion varied among people of different ages and by sex, increasing among those over 45, especially for women. The abortion rate in Japan is officially estimated at 37.4 per 100 births.

- The proportion of those who viewed sterilization as an acceptable means of family planning—between 25 and 30 percent of respondents—went up with age. Currently, only 7 percent of Japanese married couples that use contraception rely on sterilization.

- Men were much more positive than women toward the legalization of oral contraceptives. The report speculated

Continued on next page

PRB Seeks New President

The Board of Trustees of the Population Reference Bureau has launched a search to identify a new president for PRB. Tom Merrick, who has been PRB president since 1984, will join the World Bank as senior population advisor in September 1992. For details on the position and the search procedure, please contact Colette Thomas, assistant secretary for the PRB Board of Trustees at the Population Reference Bureau, 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20009-5728, (202) 483-1100.

Eastern Europe Reopens Abortion Debate

The winds of political change blowing through Central and Eastern Europe, combined with economic turmoil, are having a significant impact on family planning and abortion policies. In most countries, the receding influence of Communism has been associated with the rise of a new conservatism. Coalitions of nationalists and the Catholic Church are fostering antiabortion initiatives and calls for a return to "traditional" family values. As one woman commented to Lyn Thomas of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), "We have exchanged reproductive rights for democratic rights."

Yet, in the former USSR and elsewhere in the region, abortion remains the major available means for women to avoid unwanted or mistimed births, in part due to the scarcity of modern contraceptive supplies.

In Bulgaria, raging inflation is pricing most people out of the market for contraceptives, but abortion continues to be available at low cost. In Czechoslovakia, an advisory commission is proposing to charge a fee for previously free abortions. Within the country's Czech areas, the cost of an abortion for other than medical reasons went up, while contraceptives remain free on prescription. In Hungary, the Constitutional Court declared the country's liberal abortion regulations unconstitutional and gave parliament until the end of 1992 to change them. Yugoslavia is in a state of fragmentation, with conservative elements directing numerous attacks at the liberal abortion law.

In the former German Democratic Republic, subsidies for contraceptives,

organized child care, and kindergartens have been withdrawn or sharply curtailed. The question of how to integrate the liberal abortion legislation still prevailing in the former East German states with the more restrictive Federal German statutes remains unresolved.

In Poland, where the Pope has undertaken a personal effort to rescind the liberal 1956 abortion law of his native country, the Ministry of Health imposed new regulations in May 1990 restricting access to legal abortion. The following September, the Upper House of Parliament approved a Church-backed near-total ban, which was blocked by the Lower House in May. Subsequently, the Congress of Polish Physicians adopted a new Code of Ethics, effective in May 1992, permitting abortions to be performed only to save the life of the woman, or when a pregnancy results from rape. A court appeal has been launched. Parliament is expected to pass antiabortion legislation later this year, despite public opinion polls showing support for continued availability of abortion.

The legalization of abortion and contraception in Romania after the fall of the obsessively pronatalist Ceausescu regime in December 1989 caused the birth rate to plunge [see *PTF* February 1992, p. 2]. Abortion use remains strong, with three times as many abortions as births recorded in 1990. Many Romanian physicians share the present prevailing public opinion that all modern methods of contraception are harmful, and that induced abortion is a cleansing process. To make abortion more expensive, the government last June raised the cost of the state-provided procedure from the

equivalent of 1 to 10 percent of the average monthly salary.

In Albania, the new government liberalized abortion on a *de facto* basis in June 1991. The Ministry of Health did this by issuing a decree that permitted abortion on request if the husband consents or if the pregnancy is conceived out-of-wedlock.

At the 1990 conference in Tbilisi, Georgia, "From Abortion to Contraception," health officials from what is now the former Soviet Union acknowledged that reliance on abortion is a major health problem. It was officially estimated in 1989 that women of the former Soviet Union averaged three abortions in their reproductive years; other informed estimates put this figure at six or more. As in Romania, physicians have greater financial incentives to perform abortions than to provide contraceptive services. Throughout the region, many initiatives to strengthen family planning are underway, with international help from such organizations as the World Bank, UNFPA, WHO, IPPF, and others. Following the demise of the USSR Ministry of Health last fall, the Russian Republic's Ministry of Health assumed responsibility for continuing negotiations with American, British, Dutch, German, and Japanese firms to produce contraceptives domestically.

—Henry P. David

Adapted with permission from "Abortion in Europe, 1920-91: A Public Health Perspective," *Studies in Family Planning*, 23(1), 1992. Henry P. David is director of the Transnational Family Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland.

Japanese Fertility

Continued from previous page

that, since 75 percent of Japanese that use contraception rely on the male condom, a man may be more frequently inconvenienced by contraception than a woman. A long-term ban on the pill for routine contraceptive use was upheld in March, the Ministry of Health citing the danger of the spread of AIDS if the pill lessened condom use.

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- Many respondents viewed Japan as overpopulated. Almost half (47 percent) considered the current population of 124 million as "too many" or "somewhat too many;" 35 percent replied "just right size"; and 6 percent "somewhat low" or "too low." At the same time, 25 percent saw the prospect of declining population and aging as very undesirable; only 15 percent considered it desirable. Nearly half

(48 percent) of those who said "undesirable" were ready to accept a pronatalist policy rather than massive introduction of foreign workers.

- Japan is the largest donor country to UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). Over 41 percent of those interviewed favored family planning assistance to developing countries.

—Machiko Yanagishita

April 1992

House Committee Debates U.S. Family Norms

Michael Sauter



Mixing bytes and babies: like half of mothers with children under age three, she's in the labor force.

The U.S. House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, chaired by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), met on February 19th for a hearing titled, "America's Families: Conditions, Trends, Hopes, and Fears." Witnesses included Sen. John D. Rockefeller, pollsters, policy analysts, demographers, and even 14-year-old TV personality Jason Zimbler of *Clarissa Explains It All*.

The 36-member House committee, formed in 1983, does not initiate legislation, but issues it airs often find their way into legislative proposals. The first of several sessions planned for this year, it was an appropriate setting for what ensued: a debate about norms of family structure in the United States.

The committee's discussion centered around two issues: first, the viability of the traditional family model and second, whether government policies (for example, welfare programs) discourage the formation of traditional families or encourage the formation of non-traditional families.

The testimonies of Gary Bauer of the Family Research Council and Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation argued the superiority of the traditional family—defined as the family where

father works while mother takes care of the house and children. Deviations from what Bauer called the "breadwinner-homemaker model" have become increasingly prevalent in recent decades. Census Bureau figures show that more than one-fourth of families with children are single-parent families. A recent analysis of CPS data by Decision Demographics, PRB's consulting arm, shows that only about 12 percent of all U.S. families with children consist of a married couple with the father in the labor force and the mother not working outside the home.

Rep. Clyde C. Holloway (R-LA) and Rep. Bob McEwen (R-OH) questioned Sen. Rockefeller (D-WV),

who headed the 1991 National Commission on Children, concerning the emotional well-being of children in single-parent families. The commission's report, *Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and Families*, had concluded that "children do best when they have the personal involvement and material support of a father and a mother." Rockefeller offered his view that the single-parent family should be held in the same regard as the two-parent family.

Rector raised the issue of tax policies, severely criticizing the "eroding value of the personal exemption," the standard deduction that parents can take on their federal income taxes for each child. McEwen brought up the question—much debated among policymakers and policy analysts alike—of whether the current welfare system encourages young, low-income women to have children and remain unmarried by providing an economic incentive not to marry.

Pat Schroeder posed the question: Are we trying to help all families, or only those that fit a narrow definition?

Three demographers presented information on trends in U.S. family structures: Donald Hernandez, chief of the Census Bureau's Marriage and Families Statistics Branch; Thomas Plewes,

Associate Commissioner for Employment and Unemployment Statistics; and Greg Duncan, program director of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Hernandez noted a stratification of income by family type. Well over one-half (62 percent) of single-parent families have incomes of less than \$20,000 per year, falling to 37 percent for blended families (that is, step families) and 27 percent for intact married-couple families. Hernandez maintained that today's family structure results from "historic changes in family living arrangements and in mothers' work" that "guarantee...that people will have family experiences which are much more varied than did Americans living during the first two-thirds of this century."

Plewes noted that regardless of family structure, mothers are increasingly likely to be in the labor force, either full-time or part-time. From 1980 to 1991, participation rates for mothers with children under age three increased from 42 to 55 percent. In fact, by 1991 a little over half of the mothers with children under age one were in the labor force. A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics report, however, points out that the increase in women's labor force participation stalled in 1990, although it is too early to tell if growth in women's employment has topped out.

Duncan reported that between 1978 and 1990 the fraction of families with children in the "middle class" (which he defined as those with family incomes between \$20,000 and \$50,000) fell by 11 percent, while the proportions of higher- and lower-income families increased. Nontraditional family types, especially single parent families, were more vulnerable economically.

Global economic factors, especially those rooted in technological changes in the workplace, underlie these trends, said Duncan. The recession has focused attention on jobs, but the crucial policy issues are longer-term investments in work-related skills, as well as the shorter-run package of taxes and benefits to working and lower-middle class families with children.

—Laura Ellen Harris
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Dropouts: Doing It By the Numbers

by John H. Ralph and Mary J. Frase

"What is the high school dropout rate?" Policymakers and parents alike want to know how many teenagers drop out of school—in their community and across the nation. For such a simple question, the answers are surprisingly complicated. The dropout rate can mean several things:

- How many students leave school over the course of an academic year?
- How many young people disrupt their education by not completing high school in four continuous years?
- How many young adults end up without a high school education?

Dropping out of high school can be a turning point in the life of a young person, often with lasting consequences for the dropout and for society. Lack of a high school diploma, or its equivalent, suggests to employers that a young person may not have sufficient knowledge or skills to function productively in the workplace. Those who do not complete high school earn less than those who do—30 percent smaller lifetime earnings for males and 45 percent less for females according to one study.¹ Another study indicated that dropouts have a more difficult time in the job market than high school graduates, with one in six dropouts unemployed in 1986 and dropouts twice as likely as graduates to have not found work that year.² On a societal level, the dropout rate raises questions about the future competitiveness of the U.S. workforce.

Over the long term, high school completion has risen dramatically in the United States. In 1920, only about one-fifth of people in their late 20s had completed high school, a figure that increased to just over half by 1950.³ The racial gap in education was extremely deep, with only 6 percent of non-whites completing high school in 1920. Today,

the gap in dropout rates for blacks and whites seems to be closing, but remains wide for Hispanics, as the chart on the facing page shows.

Dropouts and Stopouts

Dropping out of school occurs for a variety of reasons and at various times. A student may leave high school because of academic, school disciplinary, or family difficulties, because of pregnancy, or to get a job. Low socioeconomic status is a major risk factor. However, dropping out is not always associated with poor academic performance or low ability as measured by standardized tests. In the long-term High School and Beyond study of the sophomore class of 1980, two out of three of those who dropped out had grade averages of "C" or better. On standardized tests, about half the dropouts in the study scored in the bottom quintile, however, 80 percent of their low-scoring counterparts graduated on time.⁴

Dropping out occurs throughout the high school years. Between October 1989 and October 1990, 3.0 percent of 15 year olds, 2.6 percent of 16-17 year olds, and 5.4 percent of 18-19 year olds dropped out of school. Some drop out even earlier. Findings from the ongoing National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS:88) suggest that 6.8 percent of students who were in the 8th grade in 1988 had

dropped out of school by the time their class reached 10th grade in 1990.


A considerable number of students who drop out return to complete high school months or years later, becoming late completers: "stopouts" rather than dropouts. In the High School and Beyond study, 82.7 percent completed high school by June 1982 (see Figure 1). An additional 5.2 percent had completed high school two years later. By 1986, four years after the "on time" graduation date, another 2.8 percent had completed, leaving 9.2 percent who had still not completed their high school education.

About one-third of the late completers obtain a regular diploma. About two-thirds earn a high school equivalency certificate such as passing the General Education Development (GED) test, administered by the American Council on Education. More than 630,000 people in the United States took the GED test in 1989, with 357,000 receiving credentials.

Measuring the Dropout Rate

Dropping out is a notoriously difficult phenomenon to measure, especially on the local level. School systems differ on when to classify as a dropout a student who has been absent for a period of time.

Figure 1. On-time Graduates, Dropouts, and Late Completers: Sophomore Class of 1980



Source: U.S. Department of Education, *Dropout Rates in the United States: 1988*, prepared for the National Center for Education Statistics by Mary J. Frase (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989), Table 13.


Returnees and multiple incidents of dropping out create measurement problems. Moreover, the United States is an extremely mobile society. Students whose families move from one school district to another may be inadvertently classified as dropouts. Private school students are sometimes miscounted, plus states vary in how they classify young adults in prison or in the military. For all these reasons, measures that rely on school-level information frequently overstate the dropout rate.

At the national level, the dropout rate is tracked through a supplement of education questions included in the Census Bureau's October Current Population Survey (CPS). It is reported (since 1989) in the National Center for Education Statistics' annual report to Congress on dropout and retention rates, which contains most of the data cited in this article. The survey identifies people 15 and older who were enrolled in grades 10 to 12 a year ago, are not enrolled now, and have not completed high school. The CPS data yield several measures, the most important of which are the event dropout rate and the status dropout rate.

• **The event dropout rate.** This measure tells the proportion of students who drop out over a given 12-month period and have not returned. To obtain this rate, dropouts (those who during the past year left grades 10-12 without completing) are divided by the sum of dropouts plus those who graduated or are still in school. The school-age population is defined as those 15-24. Between October 1989 and October 1990, some 4.1 percent of 15-24 year olds in grades 10-12 dropped out of school before completion or about 347,000 students.

• **The status dropout rate.** Those individuals in a specified age range who have not completed high school and are not currently enrolled in school are called *status dropouts*. Status dropout rates include people who have dropped out over a multi-year period, so they are considerably higher than event dropout rates for a single year. In 1990, about

Figure 2. Status Dropout Rates, by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, Ages 16-24: 1973-1990



Note: Black and white data are for non-Hispanic blacks and whites only.

Source: U.S. Department of Education, *Dropout Rates in the United States: 1990*, prepared for the National Center for Education Statistics by Phillip Kaufman, Marilyn M. McMillen, and Summer D. Whitener (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), Figure 4.

12.1 percent of persons age 16-24, about 3.8 million people, were classified as status dropouts.

A Mixed Picture

Dropout rates vary by race, ethnicity, and sex, as Figure 2 shows. Dropout rates of blacks, historically higher than those of whites, remain higher today—but the racial difference is getting smaller. In 1975, 22.9 percent of non-Hispanic black males ages 16-24 were neither in school nor held a high school credential, while only 10.9 percent of their non-Hispanic white counterparts were in that situation. By 1990, only 9.3 percent of white and 11.9 percent of black males of that age were status dropouts. Thus, over the course of 15 years, the racial gap narrowed from almost 14 to less than 3 percentage points. Gender differences in likelihood of being a dropout within racial groups also seem to be disappearing.

The status dropout rates for Hispanics are relatively higher, above 30

percent, for most of the past decade. One factor is that Hispanics seem to be less likely than non-Hispanics to return to high school or complete by means of an equivalency test once they have dropped out. About half of both black and white dropouts in the High School and Beyond study, but only about one-third of Hispanics, returned to complete high school.

At older ages as well, the racial gap in high school attainment can be observed to be narrowing. The high school completion rate of blacks has increased at a faster rate than for whites since the early 1970s.

In 1973, 62 percent of blacks age 30-34 had completed high school, compared with 80 percent of whites that age.⁵ In 1990, 83 percent of blacks age 30-34 had completed high school, compared with 91 percent of whites. In contrast, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, no more than 60 percent of Hispanic 30-34 year olds had completed high school. Immigrants without U.S. high school credentials may account for part of this gap.

Continued on next page

The World According to Generation X

In a sense, the high school dropout phenomenon is part of a larger youth trend that demographer Ronald Rindfuss calls "disorder in the life course."⁸ Rindfuss points out that, increasingly, young people do not pass the milestones of adulthood in the traditional order that is, first completing one's education, then getting married, then establishing a household, and, after that, having children.

Instead, many young people may set up a household first and marry later, and may finish their education (especially a post-college degree) still later. Evidently, failure to complete high school within the expected time is not the end of the education story for many young people who drop out, which suggests that dropout programs should include not only prevention efforts but also a component targeted at returnees.

There may always remain frustration at the lack of a single dropout measure, particularly one that might serve as a report card on the functioning of local schools. But the dropout debate should not distract us from more basic problems concerning the effectiveness of our educational system—such as low learning levels for high school graduates as well as dropouts and continuing wide gaps in cognition performance between racial and ethnic groups at all educational levels.

Notes:

1. Theodore C. Wagenaar, "What Do We Know About Dropping Out of High School?" *Research in the Sociology of Education and Socialization*, 7 (1987), pp. 161-190.
2. James P. Markey, "The Labor Market Problems of Today's High School Dropouts," *Monthly Labor Review* 111, no. 6 (June 1988), pp. 36-43.
3. Jeanne E. Griffith, Mary J. Frase, and John H. Ralph, *American Education: The Challenge of Change*, PRB Population Bulletin 44, no. 4, (1989).
4. John Ralph and Laura Hersch Salganik, "Dropouts, School Performance, and Standards: What is the Causal Link?" *Youth Policy* (February 1988).
5. Phillip Kaufman, Marilyn M. McMillen, and Sumner D. Whitener, *Dropout Rates in the United States, 1990* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991).
6. Ronald R. Rindfuss, "The Young Adult Years: Diversity, Structural Change, and Fertility," *Demography* 28, no. 4, (November 1991).

In the only novel we've seen that defines terms in the margins and includes an appendix with Census Bureau factoids—young Canadian writer Douglas Coupland spins social satire from the threads of demographic theory.

The theory in question is Richard Easterlin's notion that "the success of a generation's members may be crucially affected by how numerous they are" (*Birth and Fortune*, 1980). In Coupland's novel, *Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture*, protagonists Andy, Claire, and Dag live in a Southern California edge city, work in McJobs (see below), and console each other about life's scarce pickings. The philosophical Dag blames his quasi-voluntary underemployment on the enormous size of the generation that preceded him, which gobbled up the housing-jobs-opportunity banquet and left him only a few stale crumbs.

Dag calls the target of his envy "baby boomers," but demographers would more properly call them "leading edge" boomers. The feckless, pushing-thirty crew that populates *Generation X* are themselves "trailing edge" boomers, born after 1955 (baby-boom births span 1946-1964).

The novel abounds with new terms for social phenomena, coined or collected—and succinctly defined—by Douglas Coupland. Here is a sampling:

Air Family: Describes the false sense of community and intimacy experienced among coworkers in an office environment.

Bleeding Ponytail: An aging sold-out baby boomer who pines for hippie or pre-sellout days.

Boomer Envy: Envy of material wealth and long-range material security accrued by older members of the baby-boom generation by virtue of fortunate births.

Divorce Assumption: A form of Safety Net-ism, the belief that if a marriage doesn't work out, there is no problem because partners can simply seek a divorce.

Earth Tones: A youthful subgroup interested in vegetarianism, tie-dyed outfits, mild recreational drugs, and good

stereo equipment. Earnest, frequently lacking in humor.

Down-nesting: The tendency of parents to move to smaller, guest-room-free houses after the children have moved away so as to avoid children age 20 to 30 who have boomeranged home.

Homeowner Envy: Feelings of jealousy generated in the young and disenfranchised when facing gruesome housing statistics.

Lessness: A philosophy whereby one reconciles oneself with diminishing expectations of material wealth: "I've given up wanting to make a killing or be a bigshot. I just want to find happiness and maybe open up a little roadside café in Idaho."

Occupational Slumming: Taking a job well beneath one's skills or education level as a means of retreat from adult responsibilities and/or avoiding possible failure in one's true occupation.

Squires: The most common X generation subgroup and the only subgroup given to breeding. Squires exist almost exclusively in couples and are recognizable by their frantic attempts to recreate a semblance of Eisenhower-era plenitude in their daily lives in the face of exorbitant housing prices and two-job lifestyles.

Legislated Nostalgia: To force a body of people to have memories they do not actually possess: "*How can I be a part of the 1960s generation when I don't even remember any of it?*"

McJob: A low-pay, low-prestige, low-dignity, low-benefit, no-future job in the service sector. Frequently considered a satisfying career choice by people who have never held one.

Safety Net-ism: The belief that there will always be a financial and emotional safety net to buffer life's hurts. Usually parents.

Veal-fattening Pen: Small, cramped office workstation built of fabric-covered disassemblable wall partitions and inhabited by junior staff members. Named after the small preslaughter cubicles used by the cattle industry. Also, Junior Stockyard or Junior Ghetto.

—Susan Kalish

April 1992

Joseph L. Fisher, 1914-1992

We are saddened by the death of Joseph L. Fisher, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Population Reference Bureau, who passed away at his home on February 19th after a long struggle with cancer. He had served as the Chairman of the PRB board since 1988. He also served as a Trustee from 1981 to 1987. He was elected PRB Honorary Fellow in 1987.

Population was one of many areas of interest of this distinguished man, who served Virginia's 10th Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives. He was chairman of the Arlington County Board, secretary of the Virginia Department of Human Resources under former Governor Charles Robb, and president of the environmental research foundation Resources for the Future for over a decade.

At the time of his death, Dr. Fisher was Distinguished Visiting Professor of Political Economy at George Mason University where, as Special Assistant to the President, he was active in fostering the development of the young Northern Virginia institution.

Born in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, Fisher graduated from Bowdoin College in 1935 and received a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1947 and an M.A. in Education from the George Washington University in 1952. Before World War II, he worked for the National Planning Board, and then served with the Army in the Pacific.

He was an executive officer and senior economist with the Council of Economic Advisers from the end of the war until 1953. He then joined Resources for the Future, where he served as president between 1959 and 1974. In 1973, he was elected to the Arlington County Board, where he became an advocate of reform and regional cooperation. Beginning in 1974 he served three two-year terms in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Fisher wrote many articles and books and taught at various universities including Harvard, the University of California (at Berkeley and Santa Cruz), the University of Colorado, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, George

April 1992

Estimated United States Population:

As of December 1, 1991	253,887,000
As of December 1, 1990	251,172,000

The above estimates, based on the 1990 Census, include armed forces overseas and are from U.S. Bureau of the Census *Current Population Reports*, P-25, no. 1082.

Estimated World Population:

As of April 1992	5,453,000,000
Annual growth	93,000,000

Extrapolated from the mid-1991 population on PRB's 1991 *World Population Data Sheet*

Latest Provisional Statistics for the U.S.: October 1991

12 months ending with October						
Number			Rate			
1991	1990	1991	1990	1989	1988	
Live births	4,127,000	4,159,000	16.3	16.6	16.1	15.9
Deaths	2,153,000	2,174,000	8.5	8.7	8.6	8.9
Natural increase	1,974,000	1,985,000	7.8	7.9	7.5	7.0
Marriages	2,390,000	2,462,000	9.4	9.8	9.6	9.7
Divorces	1,189,000	1,185,000	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.8
Infant deaths	35,800	38,400	8.9	9.2	9.8	10.0

Note: Rates are given per 1,000 population, except for infant deaths, which are given per 1,000 live births.

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, vol. 40, no. 10 (1992).

Washington University, Virginia Commonwealth University, and George Mason University. He served on the boards of numerous organizations, including the National Academy of Public Administration, Wilderness Society, American Forestry Association, Environment and Energy Study Institute, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, and the World Future Society.

The executive committee of the board has elected Charles S. Tidball, M.D., to serve the remainder of Dr. Fisher's term as chair. Dr. Tidball, recently retired from George Washington University, has been a member of the board since 1988.

As an editorial in the *Washington Post* noted, Fisher "combined a first rate intellect with a strong commitment to principle."

"Joe gave us dedicated and caring leadership," commented PRB's President, Tom Merrick. "His ability to pull people of disparate viewpoints together to work toward a common goal was unique. We will deeply miss his wise and friendly counsel."

Upcoming Conferences

• **National Carrying Capacity Issues Conference**, Washington, DC, June 19-21, 1992. Activists, policymakers, academics and journalists will examine policy options concerning land use, water resources, energy consumption and alternatives, sustainable agriculture, the linkages between population and environment, growth management, and other issues.

Contact: Carrying Capacity Network, 1325 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005. Phone: 202-879-3044 or 800-466-4866, Fax: 202-879-3019.

• **Creating the 21st Century: Institutions and Social Change**, Anaheim Hilton Hotel and Towers, Anaheim, California, August 14-16, 1992. Leading futurists will share ideas on new technologies, education, business, government, the environment, health, the family, and much more.

Contact: World Future Society, 7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 450, Bethesda, MD 20814. Phone: 301-656-8274, Fax: 301-951-0394.

TAKE A NUMBER

States Population Estimates, 1991 and Change Since the 1990 Census

	July 1st 1991 (in 1,000s)	April 1st 1990 (in 1,000s)	Change 1990-1991 (in 1,000s)	Percent change		July 1st 1991 (in 1,000s)	April 1st 1990 (in 1,000s)	Change 1990-1991 (in 1,000s)	Percent change
UNITED STATES	252,177	248,710	3,467	1.4	District of Columbia	598	607	-9	-1.4
NORTHEAST	50,976	50,809	167	0.3	Virginia	6,286	6,187	99	1.6
New England	13,197	13,207	-10	-0.1	West Virginia	1,801	1,793	7	0.4
Maine	1,235	1,228	7	0.5	North Carolina	6,737	6,629	108	1.6
New Hampshire	1,105	1,109	-5	-0.4	South Carolina	3,560	3,487	73	2.1
Vermont	567	563	4	0.7	Georgia	6,623	6,478	144	2.2
Massachusetts	5,996	6,016	-20	-0.3	Florida	13,277	12,938	339	2.6
Rhode Island	1,004	1,003	1	0.1	East South Central	15,347	15,176	171	1.1
Connecticut	3,291	3,287	4	0.1	Kentucky	3,713	3,685	28	0.8
Middle Atlantic	37,779	37,602	177	0.5	Tennessee	4,953	4,877	76	1.5
New York	18,058	17,990	67	0.4	Alabama	4,089	4,041	49	1.2
New Jersey	7,760	7,730	30	0.4	Mississippi	2,592	2,573	19	0.7
Pennsylvania	11,961	11,882	79	0.7	West South Central	27,147	26,703	445	1.7
MIDWEST	60,225	59,669	556	0.9	Arkansas	2,372	2,351	21	0.9
East North Central	42,414	42,009	405	1.0	Louisiana	4,252	4,220	32	0.7
Ohio	10,939	10,847	92	0.8	Oklahoma	3,175	3,146	29	0.9
Indiana	5,610	5,544	65	1.2	Texas	17,349	16,987	363	2.1
Illinois	11,543	11,431	112	1.0	WEST	54,060	52,786	1,274	2.4
Michigan	9,368	9,295	72	0.8	Mountain	14,035	13,659	377	2.8
Wisconsin	4,955	4,892	63	1.3	Montana	808	799	9	1.2
West North Central	17,811	17,660	151	0.9	Idaho	1,039	1,007	33	3.2
Minnesota	4,432	4,375	57	1.3	Wyoming	460	454	6	1.3
Iowa	2,795	2,777	18	0.7	Colorado	3,377	3,294	82	2.5
Missouri	5,158	5,117	41	0.8	New Mexico	1,548	1,515	33	2.2
North Dakota	635	639	-4	-0.7	Arizona	3,750	3,665	84	2.3
South Dakota	703	696	7	1.0	Utah	1,770	1,723	47	2.7
Nebraska	1,593	1,578	14	0.9	Nevada	1,284	1,202	82	6.8
Kansas	2,495	2,478	17	0.7	Pacific	40,025	39,127	897	2.3
SOUTH	86,916	85,446	1,470	1.7	Washington	5,018	4,867	151	3.1
South Atlantic	44,421	43,567	854	2.0	Oregon	2,922	2,842	80	2.8
Delaware	680	666	14	2.1	California	30,380	29,760	620	2.1
Maryland	4,860	4,781	78	1.6	Alaska	570	550	20	3.7
					Hawaii	1,135	1,108	27	2.4

Note: change and percent change based on unrounded data.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

In the Census Bureau's first set of state population estimates since the 1990 Census, formerly fast-growing New England has begun to lose population. The Gulf states, particularly Texas, are on the rise again. While both California and Florida remain big gainers, the pace of their increase has slowed.



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We're finding signs of the times in our mailbox: stamps from nations so new that old return addresses (e.g. USSR) on the stationery are still being changed by hand.

Here are stamps from newly sovereign countries of Estonia and Croatia (Hrvatska), along with a U.S. response to the new order: the 1992 love stamp, a world map displayed in a highly unusual projection—a heart-shaped earth against a starry sky.



CONSUMER POWER: How Americans Spend Their Money, by Margaret Ambry. Ithaca: New Strategist Publications, 1991. 461 pp. \$69.95. ISBN: 0-9628092-0-9.

This book takes advantage of one of the most underused federal datasets: the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The CEX is produced by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) based on detailed consumer expenditure data gathered from a national sample of Americans every year by the U.S. Census Bureau.

Consumer Power offers a vast array of tables generated from the 1988 CEX, and includes projections to 1995 and 2000 based on the Census Bureau's projections for number of households by age of householder. The bulk of the book consists of detailed tables for each of nine expenditure areas, including: 1) food and alcoholic beverages; 2) housing: shelter and utilities; 3) household operations and furnishings; 4) apparel and apparel services; 5) transportation; 6) health care; 7) entertainment; 8) personal care, reading, education, tobacco products; and 9) financial products and services, cash contributions, gifts, and other items.

Tables provide data by age, income, and household type. Five-year trends from the Consumer Expenditure Survey are also provided in each section. A summary chapter offers tables for all products and services given by several demographic characteristics of consumer units.

This book provides a very useful summary of expenditure patterns for different types of consumer units as well as detailed information on products or services. Dr. Ambry has done a good job of making the tables readable and the subject matter is well organized. For anyone trying to grasp the broad trends and patterns in consumer

spending, *Consumer Power* is well worth the price.

—William P. O'Hare

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WELFARE IN GHANA, 1987-88, by Parl Glewee and Kwaku A. Twum-Baah. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991. 94 pp. \$7.95. ISBN: 0-8213-173-6.

This report is based on the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) which obtained information on the living standards of Ghanaians from a sample of 3,200 households in 1987 and 1988. Using household expenditures as a measure, the authors find disturbing evidence of inequalities between rural and urban areas, as well as between the coastal, forest and savannah regions of the country. These findings and the suggested remedies have implications for policymakers.

Despite its contribution to policy formulation, the report is flawed in several respects. The study divides Ghana into three geo-ecological regions which are unrelated to the ten political divisions where policy formulation and implementation take place. Thus, interpretation of findings for policy implementation is rendered difficult. Also, the poverty measure in the study—arbitrarily set at 32,500 cedis per year (about \$US176)—may be of less significance to policymakers than a poverty measure based on minimum calorie intake.

The authors ignore cultural variables in their study. For example, the incomes and expenditures of the self-employed and farmers are more likely to be understated, inaccurate and/or unreliable than persons who work in the more formal sectors of the economy. Rural household expenditures which are based on the exchange economy also tend to under-value rural welfare because of the prevalence of reciprocal relationships, mutual aid, and self-help activity in these communities.

The report neglects to mention the effect of community services on

welfare, or discuss the quality and accessibility of community services to rural and urban residents. The report does not provide answers to critical questions about what makes some regions and groups in the country more vulnerable than others, and how household and community welfare can be improved. As an exploratory piece, however, the report is worth reading.

—Michael Burayidi

Books Received

Applied Demography: An Introduction to Basic Concepts, Methods, and Data, by Steve H. Murdock and David R. Ellis. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. 299 pp. ISBN: 0-8133-8372-2. \$29.95.

Family Development, supplementary course materials, by Susan S. Coady. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1992. 53 pp. ISBN: 0-8403-7309-0. \$6.95.

Taking Population Seriously, by Frances Moore Lappé and Rachel Schurman. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1990. 87 pp. ISBN: 0-935028-54-4. \$7.95.

Zimbabwe: Financing Health Services, World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992. 84 pp. ISBN: 0-8213-1900-0. \$7.95.

Organizing and Managing Tropical Disease Control Programs, by Bernard H. Liese, et al. Washington, DC: World Bank Technical Paper #159, 1991. 51 pp. ISBN: 0-8213-1959-0. \$6.95.

Dynamics of Nutrient Cycling and Food Webs, by D.L. DeAngelis. New York: Chapman and Hall, Population and Community Biology Series 9, 1992. 270 pp. ISBN: 0-412-29840-6. \$35.00, paperback.

Japan

Population: 123.8 million
 Land area: 143,750 sq. mi.
 Births per 1,000 population: 10
 Deaths per 1,000 population: 7
 Rate of natural increase: 0.3
 Total fertility rate: 1.5
 Infant mortality rate: 4.5 per 1,000 live births
 Life expectancy: 79
 Capital: Tokyo

by Machiko Yanagishita



Japan, with a surface area slightly smaller than California, lies on the north-west side of the Pacific Ocean stretching 2,400 miles from North to South. The country consists of four major islands and about 3,900 small islands. About 72 percent of Japan's land area is mountainous (many are volcanic), and its 124 million people are squeezed into the remaining 28 percent. About one-quarter of the total population lives in the Tokyo metropolitan area.

Although the population is 99 percent Japanese, the country has several minority groups, including Koreans, Ainu, and Buraku. Although the social and human rights of such minorities are now secured under the law, residential segregation and unfair employment practices have not disappeared completely.

Thriving manufacturing growth over the past four decades has made Japan a leading economic power, with a gross national product of US\$2.9 trillion. With scarce natural resources, the country's economy is highly dependent on the import of raw materials and export of value-added industrial products. Japan

depends more on imported food than any other industrialized country and imports 99 percent of its oil.

After the oil crisis of the early 1970s, Japan made efforts to reduce oil consumption including recycling and to manufacture energy-efficient consumer goods such as refrigerators, television sets, and cars. The proportion of oil in Japan's overall energy use subsequently dropped—from 73 percent in 1975 to 57 percent in 1989—with nuclear energy taking up much of the slack.

The demographic transition from high to low levels of mortality and fertility started much later in Japan than in other industrialized countries, but occurred very quickly (see stories, pages 2 and 3). In 1925, the life expectancy at birth was 43 years and women averaged 5.1 births. By 1940, life expectancy had increased to 50 years, while the TFR had fallen to 4.1 children.

Immediately after World War II, amid devastated living conditions, Japan experienced an acute annual population growth of 5 percent, due to a surge of returns from abroad and a modest

post-war baby boom between 1947 and 1949. This was followed by a liberal abortion law and access to family planning, implemented by the U.S. occupation and the Japanese government. By 1960, fertility stood at 2.0 children per woman, slightly below the 2.1 replacement level. Since 1973, a peak year of the baby-boom echo, another fertility decline has taken place. With a life expectancy at birth at 75.9 years for men and 81.8 years for women, and infant deaths at 4.6 per 1,000 live births, Japan now has the lowest mortality in the world. Yet, the crowded country faces social difficulties such as high costs of housing and education.

As an outcome of a steady decline in fertility, the Japanese population has been aging rapidly, prompting the government to revise its public pension system drastically in 1986. In 1991, 12.5 percent of Japanese were age 65 or older—and that proportion is expected to rise to 27 percent by 2045.

As steady low fertility squeezes the labor supply, this well-known xenophobic country finds itself increasingly dependent on non-Japanese workers to keep its economic engine going. It is estimated that the numbers of illegal foreign workers swelled from 6,600 in 1979 to 200,000 in 1989. Most foreign workers in Japan come from neighboring Asian countries, such as China, the Philippines, and Thailand. Some are descendants of Japanese emigrants to South America. Japan is now struggling to establish an immigration policy. The prospect raises a wide range of social issues, from inadequate health insurance for illegal workers to the legal problems of international marriage.

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